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Forgive Me, Founding Fathers for
I Have Sinned: A Reconciliation of
Foreign Affairs Preemption After

Medellin v. Texas
ABSTRACT

The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants the

federal government the authority to make the law of the land
and, in turn, preempt state law that is incompatible with the
federal government's legislative and treaty making efforts. In
addition, other provisions of the Constitution authorize the
federal government to participatein matters of foreign affairs,
and the Supreme Court has found this authority to be exclusive
to the federal government in a number of cases. However, the
Constitution is silent on the issue of when federal preemption of
state law is appropriatewhen states seek to legislate in matters
of foreign affairs. In American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi,
the Supreme Court found that California's Holocaust Victim
Insurance Relief Act of 1999 violated the foreign affairs power of
the national government. The Court's reasoning rested on the
premise that the executive power includes the power to conduct
foreign affairs on behalf of the nation. Ultimately, the Court
employed a two-prong test that justified preemption: whether an
express federal policy was in place at the time the state law was
enacted and whether the conflict between the two laws was
sufficient to permit preemption of the state law. In 2008, in
Medellin v. Texas, the Court did not allow for preemption
despite the factual similarities to the Garamendi case. These
two cases demonstrate the complications surrounding federal
preemption of state law in matters of foreign affairs, specifically
in areas in which the federal government has yet to act. This
Note seeks to rectify foreign affairs preemption cases and argues
for a policy-based approachgrounded in a factor analysis.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The federal government has historically derived its exclusive
authority to conduct foreign affairs from an amalgamation of
provisions in the U.S. Constitution.
Under the Articles of
Confederation, the federal government lacked power to invalidate
state laws that improperly conflicted with treaties or foreign
initiatives, resulting in the federal government's inability to
articulate a coherent foreign policy.' Consequently, the Founding
Fathers sought to combat this decentralization through specific
provisions of the Constitution that granted the federal government
the supreme authority to make the laws of the land.2 Article I,
Section Eight outlines the power of Congress to conduct foreign
affairs, 3 while Article II authorizes the Executive Branch to
participate in matters of international import. 4 Together, these two

1.
Brandon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance
Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 825, 843 (2004).
2.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land. . . .").
3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (enumerating the President's treaty power and
power to receive ambassadors).
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provisions provide the federal government with the power to conduct
international relations and interact with foreign governments. 5
Further, the Constitution exclusively allocates these powers to
the federal government and prohibits states from exercising similar
authority by barring them from entering into agreements and treaties
with international actors.6 As a result, the states' power to engage in
activities in the international forum is limited to the power reserved
to them by the Tenth Amendment. 7 Any additional action by state
governments that incidentally affects foreign affairs is subject to
congressional authorization 8 and potentially judicial scrutiny.
Utilizing this constitutional basis for authority, courts have routinely
upheld the exclusive right of the federal government to conduct
foreign affairs to the detriment of state efforts to do so. Courts have
also applied the foreign affairs doctrine in a manner that has allowed
for preemption of state laws that appear to unconstitutionally
interfere with the federal government's exclusive power.
Beyond this seemingly constitutional authority to conduct
foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld this power
as exclusive to the federal government. In United States v. Belmont,
the Court articulated that the "complete power over international
affairs is in the national government ... and cannot be subject to any
curtailment or interference on the part of the several states."9 This
notion, coupled with the preemption authority granted to the federal
government through the Supremacy Clause, has provided the
Judiciary, as well as the other branches of government, with a
justification for preempting state law that addresses international
affairs.
A number of cases have also furthered the principle that the
President may conduct international relations without prior or even
subsequent congressional approval. In United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., the Court preserved the right of the President to
act independent of congressional authorization.1 0
The Court
highlighted the "unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of

5.
The Constitution also authorizes the federal government to act on the
international stage by permitting the government to enter treaties, U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2, to create and financially support armies, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, and
define violations against the law of nations, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
6.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
7.
See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
8.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (forbidding the states from taking actions
related to foreign affairs without the "Consent of Congress").
9.
United States v. Belmont, 304 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (citing United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936)).
10.
See Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 ("[T]he President alone
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . . Into the field of
negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.").
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governmental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by
which the President is to be governed," given the inherent delicacy
with which matters of foreign affairs must be handled.'1 In order to
preserve the sovereignty of the national government and its ability to
participate in the international environment, the Court felt it was
unnecessary to hinder the President in his interactions with foreign
nations. 12
Later, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court permitted
unilateral attempts by the President to resolve international claims
without consulting Congress because of the "history of congressional
acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President."' 3 In
that case, the President sought to enforce executive orders that
implemented an executive agreement calling for the release of
American hostages in Iran.14 The petitioner filed suit in an attempt
to prevent implementation of the executive agreement on the grounds
that the President was acting outside of the scope of authority
granted to him by statute and the Constitution.' 5 Even though no
prior statutes directly addressing executive agreements existed, the
Court upheld the agreement as a valid exercise of executive authority
and seemed to expand the power of the President through a reliance
on implicit congressional authorization through inaction.1 6
Additionally, the Court granted preemptive authority to the
executive agreement, but limited its decision by arguing that
Congress had consented to the type of executive agreement that was
at issue.' 7 Citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court
justified its finding on the basis that "a systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never

before

questioned . . . may

be treated

as

a gloss on

'Executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II."'8 The
holdings in Youngstown, Curtiss-Wright, and Dames & Moore have
historically justified the President's independent authority to conduct
foreign affairs. It was not until later that these cases served as the
basis for authorizing preemption of state law under the guise of
upholding the Executive's exclusive power to act on the international
stage.
Following the lead of the Supreme Court, lower courts have
upheld the federal preemption of state law in matters of foreign

11.
Id. at 321-22.
12.
See id. at 318-22 (explaining that the President can better conduct foreign
affairs when unencumbered by congressional oversight on every decision).
13.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981).
14.
Id. at 660.
15.
Id. at 666-67.
16.
Id. at 686.
17.
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 920.
18.
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)).
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affairs.
However, the requisite conditions necessitating federal
preemption are unclear and somewhat inconsistent. Early cases
addressing the issue looked to whether the state law conflicted with
the federal law,19 while others overlooked the conflict requirement in
favor of maintaining Congress's exclusive right to legislate in matters
of foreign import. 20 As a result, no cohesive, generally applicable
standard for cases of foreign affairs preemption emerged and the
analysis became increasingly muddled.
In American Insurance Ass' v. Garamendi, the Supreme Court
attempted to articulate a standard for foreign affairs preemption
cases that would more aptly guide lower courts in their adjudications
of this issue. In that case, the Court found that California legislation
directly conflicted with the President's ability to conduct foreign
affairs, thereby upholding the conflict preemption doctrine. 21 At the
same time, the Court appeared to grant the President's policy
statement the preemptive authority previously reserved only for
documents that carried the force of law.2 2 However, in 2008, this
standard was reevaluated and modified in Medellin u. Texas. Similar
to a policy statement, the Court found that memoranda issued by the
President did not constitute enforceable, domestic law that triggers
preemption analysis even though a clear conflict between the efforts
of the state and the actions of the federal government exists. 23 As a
result, the analysis of federal preemption of state law in matters of
foreign affairs again became confusing and seemingly irreconcilable
after Medellin.
Since that decision, courts have struggled to discern a concrete
standard for foreign affairs preemption cases and the integral factors
to be considered in such analyses. In response, district courts have

19.
See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("No state can rewrite
our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies."); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 330-33 (1937) (finding that conduct in matters of foreign affairs was
exclusively reserved to the federal government and any state law that conflicted with
federal law warranted preemption).
20.
See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310 (1994)
("[The Commerce Clause] has long been understood ... to provide 'protection from
state legislation inimical to the national commerce [even] where Congress has not
acted. . . ." (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769
(1945))).
21.
Am. Ins. Ass'n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003).
22.
See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 829.
The Constitution's Article VI places the power of preemption in the legislative
branch by making laws and treaties, but not executive decrees, the supreme
law of the land. . . . Giving mere executive policy preemptive effect, as the
Court did in Garamendi, bypasses these constitutional processes and
concentrates power in the executive branch.
Id.
23.

Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522-32 (2008).
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regularly distinguished these various precedents to accommodate
their desired outcomes, and a uniform standard remains absent. This
disjunction in lower court application of Supreme Court precedent
has all but mandated an appropriate standard that is consistent with
prior rulings, the rules of federalism, and constitutional
requirements.
This Note discusses the emergence and evolution of the foreign
affairs preemption doctrine from its creation through case law to its
current unknown status after Medellin. Part II provides an outline of
the changes the preemption doctrine has undergone through varying
treatment by the Supreme Court that has caused the current
dilemma. Finally, this Note discerns the current rule in such cases
by arguing for a policy analysis of the Garamendi and Medellin
decisions, resulting in a more straightforward analysis that mitigates
the uncertainty surrounding this issue and provides more direct and
uniform guidance.

II. THE GENESIS OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

Federal preemption of state law in matters of foreign affairs is a
non-constitutional doctrine. 24 The foreign affairs preemption doctrine
was not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution by the Founding
Fathers. Nevertheless, the convention has been developed through
comingling the requirements of the Supremacy Clause and the
exclusive power of the federal government to act on the international
To further complicate matters, the Judiciary has had
stage.25
difficulty distinguishing the roles to be played by the different

24.
See Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal
Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism,57
EMORY L.J. 31, 36-37 (2007) (pointing out that the Constitution never explicitly
mentions foreign affairs preemption).

25.

Jack Goldsmith discusses the opposing view by stating:

The Framers chose a combined approach. And they chose to be specific about
which powers were exclusive and which were concurrent. Article I, Section 10
reflects a decided preference for federal over state regulation with respect to
some of the traditional "high"-agenda foreign relations issues concerning war,
peace, and diplomacy. But it does not suggest that the Constitution biases
federal over state power in the many other regulatory contexts traditionally
regulated by states that might cause (and throughout our history have caused)
foreign relations controversy-contexts that include tort and contract law,
criminal law, family law, procurement law, procedural law, education, and
much more.
Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 189
(2001) (citing Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Federalism, and Foreign Affairs, 83
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1655-59 (1997)), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/116.JG.pdf.
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branches of the federal government.2 6 As a result, one explanation
for the inconsistent application of the foreign affairs doctrine is the
lack of a guiding constitutional principle to which judges can conform.
Nevertheless, through a multitude of cases, the foreign affairs
preemption doctrine has taken on a more definite shape and proven
its continued relevance in an increasingly globalized world.
When federal preemption is viewed as a constitutional matter,
"[flederal courts have the power of preemption when interpreting the
Constitution; the President (plus two-thirds of the Senate) has the
power of preemption in undertaking treaties; and the President plus
a majority of Congress, or two-thirds of Congress acting alone, has
the power of preemption when enacting statutes."2 7 Generally, an
enumeration of powers implies that the Framers intended for that list
to be exhaustive, and there is nothing in the Constitution to suggest
that the preemption authority of the three branches should be
extended beyond this list. 28 Preemptive authority, in its most basic
form, is a legislative power that permits the creation of law that is
superior to the law promulgated by local governments.2 9 Because
preemption permits a shift in lawmaking authority from state
governments to federal governments, the validity of the federal
government's ability to act in this manner is paramount.3 0
Permitting the Executive to preempt state laws absent any action by
Congress is problematic because it allows the President to legislate.3 1
At the same time, the federal government must be able to actively
and effectively participate in international relations. These often
diametrically opposed objectives are illuminated in the cases that
have arisen under the federal preemption doctrine, as showcased by
the Court's willingness to broaden the preemptive authority of the
federal government when it deems it appropriate.3 2

26.
Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 25, at 189.
27.
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 907.
28.
See id. ("By setting forth specific allocations of preemptive power, the
Constitution contains a strong negative implication that it does not contain additional
allocations of preemptive power sub silentio.").
29.
Id. at 907-08.
30.
See id. at 827-28 ("One would hardly suppose, therefore, that the President
could unilaterally overturn a state law the President, or the President's subordinates,
thought simply to be bad policy, without the support of any legislative action and
outside the scope of Supremacy Clause.").
31.
See id. (noting that the Constitution does not explicitly give the Executive
Branch alone the power of preemption).
32.
See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (giving executive
agreements preemptive authority); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)
(same).
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Federal preemption of state law in the area of foreign affairs has
typically taken one of two forms.3 3 The more obvious preemption
cases involve the federal government promulgating a law or entering
into an international treaty that results in a conflict with a law
enacted by state governments. 34 The second type of preemption,
referred to as the dormant foreign affairs power, has historically
generated a much greater amount of adjudicatory inconsistency. This
type of preemption occurs when the federal government relies
exclusively on its authority to conduct foreign affairs as a means of
overriding state legislation, whether or not the federal government
has opted to exercise the type of authority addressed by the state
law.35 In other words, in cases in which the federal government
possesses the exclusive authority to act, but has yet to do so, the
dormant foreign affairs power allows for preemption of state law that
seeks to beat the federal government to the legislative punch.
A. Conflict Preemption
When a state law conflicts with a federal law designed to
regulate foreign affairs, the state law is often preempted. Conflict
preemption occurs when "it is impossible for a private party to comply
with both state and federal law ... and where 'under the
circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.'"36 When such cases arise,
courts generally justify preemption by invoking the authority granted
to the federal government by the Constitution.3 7 In the early case of
United States v. Belmont, the Supreme Court permitted federal
preemption on the grounds that "[g]overnmental power over external
affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national
government."3 8 That case found that an executive agreement took
precedence over state legislation and appeared to grant similar
binding authority to executive agreements that foreign affairs

33.
Celeste Boeri Pozo, Foreign Affairs Power Doctrine Wanted Dead or Alive:
Reconciling One Hundred Years of Preemption Cases, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 591, 591
(2006).
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
36.
Crosby v. Nat'1 Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000)
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
37.
See Pozo, supra note 33, at 597 ("If Congress enacts a law that conflicts
with a state law, the state law may be preempted based on a combination of the
Supremacy Clause and the specific constitutional power that granted Congress the
authority to enact the law in the first place.").
38.
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
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preemption doctrine had previously given only to international
treaties.3 9
Shortly thereafter, in United States v. Pink, the Supreme Court
held that one of the powers of the President was to participate in
foreign relations independent of congressional authorization in order
to establish the public policy objectives of the United States. 40
Moreover, the Court extended preemptive authority to executive
agreements independent of an act of Congress effectuating those
executive agreements. Much later, in Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts law
that sought to impose sanctions on Burma in direct conflict with a
federal law that "vested explicit authority with the President to
develop a comprehensive policy toward Burma." 41 In that case, both
the federal and state laws were aimed at accomplishing the same
objectives, but the federal law preempted the state legislation because
it "undermined the President's authority to conduct effective
diplomacy, bargain and leverage with other nations, and speak for
the nation with one voice." 4 2 The decision in Crosby suggested that
conflict between foreign and state law could exist outside of
substantive conflict and that mitigating the effectiveness of federal
authority was sufficient to justify preemption. From these cases, the
Supreme Court proposed that the easiest preemption cases were
those in which the content of executive agreements conflicted with
state legislation addressing a similar topic, but material conflict was
not a prerequisite for preemption. 43 At the same time, the Court
intimated that actions of the federal government did not have to carry
the force of law in order to preempt state action.
However, the Court failed to provide adequate explanation of the
various forms in which a sufficient conflict can manifest itself in
preemption cases. In American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi, the
Court found a conflict between a state law and statements made by
the Executive Branch. 44 Similarly, in Breard v. Greene, absent a
direct statement of foreign policy, the Court found a conflict by
analyzing the traditional policy interests of the executive
agreement. 45 From these two cases, it appears that discerning a

39.
Pozo, supra note 33, at 598-99.
40.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
41.
Todd Steigman, Lowering the Bar: Invalidation of State Laws Affecting
Foreign Affairs Under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power After American Insurance
Association v. Garamendi, 19 CONN. J. INT'L. L. 465, 479 (2004).
42.
Id.
43.
See id. (explaining that, before Garanendi,the Court found preemption in
cases where a state law conflicted with federal policy that carried the force of law).
44.
See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 931 (arguing that the Garamendi
court found preemption based only on statements made by the Executive Branch).
45.
Id. at 934-35.
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conflict in matters of foreign affairs is not a substantial hurdle in the
federal government's efforts to preempt state law.
Within the realm of conflict preemption, courts have upheld
federal attempts to preempt state law in instances in which a state
law is '"occupying' the same field Congress has enacted a statute
within," otherwise known as field preemption. 46 When an area of
regulation is traditionally reserved for the federal government, the
Court will strike down state laws that address that area "from
conflicting, interfering, curtailing, complementing, or enforcing
additional or auxiliary regulations upon the federal scheme." 4 7 Hines
v. Davidowitz, a 1941 case addressing the constitutionality of state
efforts to regulate aliens, reinforced the use of field preemption by
preempting legislation that was "in a field which affects international
relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has
been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national
authority." 48 When a conflict between state and federal law or
concurrent regulation exists in a field generally reserved to the
federal government, preemption of state law is easily authorized.
Interestingly enough, while Hines was a case of statutory preemption,
its reasoning and holding have been subsequently cited in matters in
which the federal government has yet to exercise lawmaking
authority. 49
B. Dormant ForeignAffairs Preemption
The dormant foreign affairs power, as the name suggests, is not
grounded in constitutional authority or congressional action, but
rather arises out of "a constitutional structure that envisions material
foreign affairs decisions being made at the federal level."50 That
constitutional structure, proponents argue, reflects an "overall design
[that] was to endow the political branches with almost all foreign
affairs powers."5 1 Moreover, the Federalist Papers made reference to
issues of foreign relations.
One reason that the Constitutional
Convention was even called was to legitimize the newly created
American nation with respect to other countries.52 Essentially, courts
have historically deduced the foreign affairs power from a variety of

46.
Pozo, supra note 33, at 599.
47.
Id. at 599-600 (relying on Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941),
which held that the registration of aliens was a power given strictly to the federal
government).
48.
Hines, 312 U.S. at 68.
49.
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 894.
50.
Id. at 852.
51.
Pozo, supra note 33, at 594.
52.
Id.
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enumerated powers that permit the federal government to
unilaterally participate in international matters .
The dormant foreign affairs power was most notably addressed
in the 1968 case Zschernig v. Miller.54 In that case, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of inheritance rights of nonresident foreign
nationals.5 5 The state of Oregon passed a law that prevented foreign
nationals from inheriting property from any estate within Oregon
absent proof that their country of origin would not confiscate that
inheritance. 5 6 In addition, the statute called for foreign countries to
provide similar rights to Americans living abroad.5 7
The Court
ultimately held that while matters of succession were generally
within the scope of the states' authority, the manner by which Oregon
sought to conduct those affairs "affect[ed] international relations in a
persistent and subtle way"58 and states could not establish
regulations that "impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign
policy"5 9 and "adversely affect the power of the central government to
deal with those problems." 60
Zschernig has become the quintessential example of the dormant
foreign affairs power because no treaty, international agreement, or
executive order existed that addressed the issue Oregon sought to
rectify, nor did the federal government act in accordance with a
constitutional grant of power. 6 1 Rather, the Supreme Court grounded
its reasoning solely in the perceived, exclusive right of the federal
government to conduct foreign affairs, analogizing this power to
Congress's power under the dormant commerce clause. 62 The holding
in Zschernig evidenced a "new constitutional doctrine"6 3 that
suggested a state law would be overturned if its effect on foreign
affairs was "more than some incidental or indirect effect" or that in
or
"great potential for disruption
some way
possessed
embarrassment" to the government's ability to enact its foreign
64
policy.

53.
See id. at 594-95 ("[T]he dormant foreign affairs power derives from the
notion that the Constitution resulted from a historical need to grant broad and
exclusive powers to the federal government for the effective conduct of the nation's
foreign affairs.").
54.
See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (using the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine to find an Oregon law invalid).
Id. at 430-31.
55.
56.
Id.
Id.
57.
58.
Id. at 440-41.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
61.
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 852-53.
Id. at 852-55.
62.
63.

1996).
64.

LOUis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 163 (2d ed.

Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35.
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Analysts have routinely criticized the Zschernig decision, and the
Supreme Court, despite multiple opportunities to overrule the
holding, has never explicitly chosen to do so. The principal concern
with the decision is its potential watershed effect. It permits a
system in which "any state law, when applied in a case involving a
foreign element, is potentially subject to judicial preemption."65
Because the decision received an inordinate amount of criticism, "the
Supreme Court did not invalidate a state law under the dormant
foreign affairs power for another thirty-five years."6 6 However, in
1994, the case of Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of
California provided the Court an opportunity to readdress the
dormant foreign affairs power. At that time, California established a
system of taxation for multinational corporations.6 7 The federal
government had a separate method of determining the appropriate
tax, and Barclays contested application of the California methodology
as an unconstitutional system of multiple taxation.6 8 Ultimately, the
Court distinguished California's system of taxation as a regulation of
commerce in general from regulation of foreign affairs. The Court
determined that a state's efforts to regulate commerce rather than
foreign affairs could only be preempted by express congressional
action rather than "actions, statements, and amicus filings" of the
Executive Branch.6 9 Because Congress had contemplated enacting
federal legislation addressing the issue, the Court found that
Congress's decision to refrain from legislating constituted
acquiescence to state efforts to regulate.7 0 Therefore, Congress's
inaction in an area in which they had authority to act, as well as
evidence of prior legislative approval of schemes similar to the one
implemented in California,7 1 implicitly authorized the states to
exercise independent legislative authority. This decision suggests
that the Executive Branch is not authorized to preempt state actions
that involve powers reserved to the Legislative Branch, i.e.,
commerce.7 2
On the other hand, many viewed the decision in
Barclays Bank as evidence that Zschernig had lost its precedential
value and that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine was dead for

65.
Goldsmith, Statutory ForeignAffairs Preemption, supra note 25, at 210.
66.
Steigman, supra note 41, at 469.
67.
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 301-03 (1994).
68.
Id. at 302-06.
69.
Id. at 321-33.
70.
Id. at 324-27.
71.
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 880-81.
72.
See Pozo, supra note 33, at 596 ("[B]ecause the issue presented was one of
commerce, a power of Congress rather than international relations, only a conflicting
federal policy expressed by Congress, rather than the Executive branch [sic], could
invalidate the law.").
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good. 7 3 However, when Gararnendipresented itself to the Court just
short of a decade later, critics discovered that the Zschernig decision
was still very much alive.
C. The State of ForeignAffairs Preemption Before Garamendi
Combining the precedents in both conflict and dormant foreign
affairs preemption, the Court created for itself a convoluted roadmap
that led to inconsistent destinations when confronted with seemingly
similar fact patterns. The holding in Belmont suggested that a direct
conflict between state and federal law had to exist in order to justify
preemption, 74 but the holding in Hines permitted preemption simply
if Congress previously occupied the field that the legislation sought to
regulate. 7 5 Similarly, Crosby found that any state law that prevented
the federal government from effectively legislating in international
affairs was subject to preemption.7 6 Under Pink and Belmont, it
appeared that executive agreements were able to preempt state law,'7 7
whereas Barclays Bank seemed to completely undermine this
proposition. At the same time, Barclays Bank insinuated a desire to
overrule the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs preemption
established in Zschernig,78 yet the Court continued to apply it in
subsequent cases. When Garamendi arrived on the Supreme Court's
docket, the current status and application of the foreign affairs
preemption doctrine was in question, and critics of the doctrine called
for a reconciliation of conflicting precedent.

III. GARAMENDI AND MEDELLIN MUDDLE THE ANALYSIS

In light of the Supreme Court's holdings in previous cases
involving foreign affairs preemption, critics of the Zschernig decision
hoped the Gararnendi case would finally reconcile the seemingly
irreconcilable approaches the Court had taken. Garamendipresented
the issue of the preemptive power of executive agreements in cases in
which state laws impede the effectiveness of those executive
agreements.79 In Gararnendino direct conflict between the state law
and the executive agreement existed, and Congress did not effectuate

73.
See id. ("Some scholars believed Barclays Bank PLC ti. Franchise Tax
Board of California, curtailed or even ended the precedential value of Zschernig.").
74.
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-33 (1937).
75.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68-75 (1941).
76.
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-74 (2000).
77.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-32 (1942); Belmont, 301 U.S. at
330.
78.
See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328-30 (1994)
(undermining the dormant foreign affairs power recognized in Zschernig).
79.
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-32.
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the agreement through legislation. 0 Yet, the Court applied the
foreign affairs preemption doctrine and prohibited the state's
authority to regulate.
Garamendi addressed the constitutionality of a California state
law, entitled the California Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of
1999 (HVIRA). 8 '
The Act required insurance companies that
conducted business within California to disclose certain information
about policies sold in Europe during the time period between 1920
and 1945 for purposes of prosecuting those companies that had
acquired the insurance policies of Holocaust victims through
larcenous means.8 2 However, the federal government, through an
executive agreement by President Clinton, enacted the German
Foundation Agreement, which established a fund to reimburse
Holocaust victims for insurance policies that were usurped during the
Nazi occupation in Germany.83 At the same time, the agreement
permitted the Foundation to serve as the sole entity responsible for
the restitution claims made against German companies that were
involved during the National Socialist Era and World War II.84
Because the purpose of HVIRA was to 'ensure the rapid resolution' of
unpaid insurance claims, 'eliminating the further victimization of
these policyholders and their families,"' 85 the federal government
feared that the California legislation would inappropriately interfere
with the effective operation of the German Foundation Agreement
and sought judicial intervention as a means of approving federal
preemption.8 6
In its holding, the Court invalidated HVIRA because it was an
unconstitutional exercise of state authority that interfered with the
federal government's ability to establish foreign policy. 8 7 The Court
argued that California's interest in passing the statute was
insufficient to permit independent state action.88 Essentially, the
Court applied a balancing test, weighing the importance of the state's
interest in legislating against the severity of the conflict between the
state and federal actions.8 9 The Court did not provide much clarity as

80.
Pozo, supra note 33, at 603.
81.
Gararnendi, 539 U.S. at 401; Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act
(HVIRA), CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800-13807 (Deering 1999).
82.
Garantendi, 539 U.S. at 408-11.
83.
Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and
the Future," U.S.-Ger., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298, 1299; Garanendi, 539 U.S. at
405.
84.
Id. at 406.
85.
Id. at 410 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 13801(e) (Deering 1999)).
86.
Gararnendi, 539 U.S. at 411.
Id. at 415-30.
87.
88.
Steigman, supra note 41, at 474.
89.
Joseph B. Crace, Jr., Note, Gara-Mending the Doctrine of Foreign Affairs
Preemption, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 217 (2004).
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to the implementation of the test, but they did provide an example of
when federal preemption would likely be appropriate:
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy
with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility,
field preemption might be the appropriate doctrine, whether the
National Government had acted, and, if it had, without reference to the
degree of any conflict [because] the Constitution entrusts foreign policy
90
exclusively to the National Government.

The Court explained that if a state tried to effectuate a statute that
was within its authority, but happened to affect foreign affairs, the
existence of a conflict could tip the balance in favor of preemption
that would fluctuate depending on the state interest at issue.9 1
Citing the need for uniformity in the area of foreign affairs, the
Court stated that California's purported consumer protection interest
was neither compelling nor persuasive. Given a weak state interest,
the extent of conflict needed for preemption is smaller. 92 At the same
time, the Court refused to overturn Zschernig and distinguished
Garamendi as an obvious case of conflict preemption.9 3 Seeming to
most closely analogize the case to Crosby, the Court reasoned that the
conflict existed between "the one-sided nature of the state
approach ... [and] the balanced, cooperative federal approach." 94 On
the issue of the lack of congressional approval of the executive
agreement, the Court found that Congress's inaction amounted to
acquiescence and deference to the Executive's authority to conduct
foreign affairs9 5 rather

than submission to the state's right to

legislate.9 6
In her dissent, Justice Ginsberg chastised the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine and argued that preemption in the absence of a
federal policy was contrary to precedent and that effectuating
preemption is only appropriate when the federal government has
provided a "clear statement."9 7 Relying on the unbinding nature of
executive agreements, Ginsburg argued, "the displacement of state
law ... requires a considerably more formal and binding federal
instrument."9 8 Absent explicit executive or congressional intent

90.
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 926 (quoting Garanendi,539 U.S. at
420 n.11).
91.
Id.
92.
See Crace, supra note 89, at 219 (explaining that, because California had a
weak interest in Garanendi, any ambiguity as to whether a conflict existed would be
"resolved in favor of the federal government").
93.
Id. at 218.
94.
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 872.
95.
Id.
Id.
96.
97.
Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 430, 436-43 (2003) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
Id. at 441.
98.
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authorized through statutory or constitutional grants of power,
preempting state laws is not proper simply based on "inference and
implication."9 9
Garamendi provided the foundation for the understanding that
even vaguely defined federal action may be sufficient to preempt
state legislation." 00 At the same time, the Court did not clarify the
basis for the decision in Zschernig, nor its application and continuing
status as binding law. 01 The Court's unwillingness to expressly
overrule Zschernig suggested that the Supreme Court implicitly
endorsed dormant foreign affairs preemption. 102 In addition, it
appeared that preemption is seemingly permitted in instances in
which a state attempts to regulate foreign affairs without justifying it
as a "'traditional state responsibility."' 0 3 Thus, presumably under
the most literal reading of Garamendi, the Court would condone state
action that served a strong traditional state interest regardless of its
effect on foreign affairs.1 04
From the host of judicial decisions leading up to Medellin v.
Texas, a series of rules can be derived. The holdings in Pink and
Belmont granted preemptive and force of law power to executive
agreements in matters in which conflict exists. 0 5
Hines
distinguished this idea by permitting field preemption in the absence
of direct conflict, arguing for the exclusive authority of the federal
government to regulate registration of aliens. 0 6 Zschernig continues
to serve as the paragon of the dormant foreign affairs power of the
federal government, which permitted federal preemption, in the
absence of federal action, on the grounds that the state's efforts
unduly interfered with federal objectives. 07
Shortly thereafter,
Barclays Bank distinguished this precedent, all but overturned it,
and explained that federal preemption in foreign affairs required
congressional action, but that congressional inaction could qualify as
acquiescence to federal preemption. 0 8 Then, Garamendi bypassed
the Zschernig analysis by fabricating a conflict and relying on the

99.
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 874 (quoting Garanendi, 539 U.S. at
442-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
100.
Crace, supra note 89, at 205.
101.
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 877-79.
102.
See id. ("The principal effect of the Court's discussion was to make
Zschernig a precedent for executive policy preemption . . . .").
103.
Crace, supra note 89, at 223 (quoting Garanendi,539 U.S. at 419 n.11).
104.
Id. ("Consequently, it is conceivable that, under the majority's analysis, a
state regulation that affects foreign affairs but also regulates a 'traditional state
responsibility' could survive a Garanendianalysis.").
105.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-32 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-32 (1937).
106.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941).
107.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968).
108.
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328-30 (1994).
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force of law authority that had been granted to executive agreements
in cases like Pink and Belmont. 0 9
The Garamendi decision did more to complicate the analysis of
foreign affairs preemption than it did to simplify it. The Court failed
to clarify the scope of the dormant foreign affairs preemption
doctrine, and it relied on a fact-specific balancing test rather than
articulating a clear standard for foreign affairs preemption cases.
Four short years later, in Medellin v. Texas,110 the Supreme Court
seemed to completely undermine its rationale in Garamendi. Rather
than analyzing whether the invalidation of state law on the basis of
conflict preemption or dormant foreign affairs preemption was
appropriate, the Court looked to whether the federal action held the
force of law."' Moreover, the Court refused to grant a presidential
memorandum the authoritativeness previously granted to executive
agreements absent explicit congressional approval."12
Joseph Medellin was a Mexican national convicted of rape and
murder and was ultimately sentenced to death." 3
However,
pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which
the United States is a party, Medellin was entitled to notify the
Mexican consulate of his arrest.1 4 But, he was never informed of his
right to do so. 1 15
Because he was not afforded this procedural
requirement, his attorneys sought to appeal his death sentence
through various adjudicative and diplomatic efforts." 6 Two such
efforts involved successful litigation brought by Mexico against the
United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ),117 as well as
Medellin's personal appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals." 8 The
ICJ's holding found that Medellin was entitled to "'review and
reconsideration' of his conviction, notwithstanding domestic
procedural rules to the contrary."" 9 Consequently, President Bush,

109.
See Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415-30 (2003) (holding
that California law was preempted by executive agreements because it interfered with
the federal government's conduct of foreign affairs).

110.

552 U.S. 491 (2008).

111.
Id. at 524.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 500-01.
114.
Id. at 501.
115.
Id.
116.
Id. at 501-04.
117.
See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31) (finding that the United States violated the Vienna Convention
by failing to inform Medellin and the other named Mexican nationals of their Vienna
Convention rights).
118.
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661 (2005) (per curiam); Ex parte
Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 322-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
119.
Margaret E. McGuinness, Three Narratives of Medellin v. Texas, 31
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 227, 229 (2008); see also Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72 (finding
that the Mexican nationals were entitled to review and reconsideration of their
convictions).
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through a memorandum, ordered the Texas Court of Appeals to
comply with this decision.120
The court of appeals refused and
dismissed Medellin's claim. 1 2'
Ultimately, the Supreme Court was
faced with the task of determining whether state courts were bound
by decisions made by the ICJ and if the President had the
constitutional authority to demand compliance from the states.
Medellin argued that the ICJ's decision was binding on the
states through the Supremacy, Treaty, and Take Care Clauses of the
Constitution.' 22 First, because the ICJ's decision was binding on the
United States as a whole, in turn, the Supremacy Clause made the
decision binding on the states severally.123 Secondly, the Executive
Branch's obligation to "take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed" through what Medellin saw as a valid lawmaking
procedure-the establishment of treaties with foreign nationsrequired the President to demand compliance from the states. 124
Texas, on the other hand, argued that the President's memorandum
was an attempt to legislate and an unconstitutional infringement on
congressional power.125 Texas further argued that the President was
invading the exclusive jurisdiction of state judiciaries and that the
ICJ's decision could not be enforced in domestic courts on private
parties.1 26
The Court's analysis relied heavily on the "distinction between
treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those
that-while they constitute international law commitments-do not
by themselves function as binding federal law."127 In other words,
certain treaties require effectuating congressional action in the
absence of explicit terminology that the President intends for a treaty
to be self-executing.128 Without a provision that specifically states
that the treaty is self-executing, the treaty will have no effect on the

120.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 503; Memorandum from President George W.
Bush to Att'y Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales (Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Bush Memorandum],
www.brownwelsh.com/Archive/2005-03-10_Avena-compliance.pdf;
McGuinness, supra
note 119, at 229.
121.
McGuinness, supra note 119, at 229; Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 504.
122.
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No.
06-984), 2007 WL 2886606, at *1.
123.
Id. at 3-4; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 504 (recounting Medellin's argument regarding
the Supremacy and Treaty clauses of the Constitution).
124.
Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 122, at 8-9; see U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3 ("[H]e shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. . . ."); Medellin v. Texas,
552 U.S. at 532 (recounting Medellin's argument based upon the Take Care Clause of
the Constitution).
125.
Brief for Respondent at 13-16, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No.
06-984), 2007 WL 2428387, at *13-16.
126.
Id. at 25-26.
127.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 504.
128.
Id. at 505.
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United States unless Congress enacts legislation to supplement it as
a means of applying it to the states.1 2 9 However, even in instances
where treaties constitute federal law, many courts have "presumed
that treaties do not create privately enforceable rights in the absence
of express language to the contrary." 3 0 Thus, in Medellin, the Court
found the Vienna Convention was not self-executing and, therefore,
without congressional action, not binding on the lower courts.1 3 1 As a
result, the President's memorandum could not preempt the Texas
Court of Appeals' decision to dismiss Medellin's writ of habeas
corpus.1 32
Through its holding in Medellin, the Court circumvented the
question of when treaties constitute binding domestic law and
preserved for itself discretion in determining such authority on a
case-by-case basis.13 3
Justice Roberts distinguished between
"international legal obligations and binding federal law" 134 by citing
the need for congressional action to extend such legal obligations
domestically.1 35
Thus, future international adjudications could
potentially serve as binding authority, provided that Congress
explicitly authorized this "wholesale effect." 3 6 As a result, the Court
suggested that domestic enforcement of matters of foreign affairs was
a product of the symbiotic relationship between the President and
Congress, whereby Congress corroborates the President's decisions by
enacting enforcing legislation.'3 7 The President's memorandum in
Medellin did not carry the force of law because Congress had yet to
issue legislation enforcing it, and the Court did not find that
congressional acquiescence to the President's action was implied. 3 8
The Court further distinguished this case from previous preemption
cases by arguing that it was an unprecedented exercise of executive
authority that infringed upon the state's inherent police power.' 3 9
The Medellin case can be most closely analogized to the case of
Breard v. Greene because the factual circumstances of the two cases
are nearly identical, yet the Court relied on different reasoning with
regard to the preemption question. In 1993, Angel Francisco Breard,

129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 506 n.3.
131.
Id. at 506.
132.
Id. at 525.
133.
Id. at 519.
134.
Mary D. Hallerman, Case Note, Medellin v. Texas: The Treaties that Bind,
43 U. RICH. L. REV. 797, 804 (2009).
135.
Id.
136.
Cindy Galway Buys, The United States Supreme Court Misses the Mark:
Towards Better Implementation of the United States' International Obligations, 24
CONN. J. INT'L L. 39, 49-50 (2009) (quoting Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 520).
137.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 520-21, 525-26.
138.
Id. at 528.
139.
Id. at 532.
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a citizen of Paraguay, was tried, convicted of attempted rape and
murder, and sentenced to death.140 In 1994, the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 14 1
Breard argued that his
conviction was invalid because his rights under the Vienna
Convention had been violated.142 Like Medellin, at the time of his
arrest, Breard was not informed by arresting authorities that he was
entitled to contact the Paraguayan Consulate.143 In response, Breard
filed a motion for habeas relief in federal district court.144 However,
the district court overruled his motion, stating that because he did
not raise it at the state level, he forfeited his right to raise it at the
federal level.145 In response, Paraguayan officials brought suit in
district court against Virginia officials, but the district court
concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Vienna
Convention did not qualify as federal law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.146
As an alternative, the Paraguayan officials filed suit in the ICJ
seeking enforcement of the Vienna Convention. 147 The ICJ issued an
order asking the United States to postpone Breard's execution
pending settlement of his claims under the ICJ.148 In Breard's writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court, he claimed that the Vienna
Convention qualified under the Supremacy Clause as the supreme
law of the land and thereby trumped state procedural requirements
that mandated he raise his habeas corpus claim at the state level. 149
The Supreme Court responded by citing the provision of the Vienna
Convention stating, "rights expressed in the Convention 'shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State,' provided that 'said laws and regulations must enable full effect
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended."' 5 0 Consequently, Breard was required to raise
his claim at the state level and, in failing to do so, sacrificed the right
to raise it in subsequent proceedings. 5 1
While the factual similarities between Medellin and Breard are
striking, one noticeable difference accounts for the different
rationales. Breard involved preemption of state statutory procedural
requirements by the Vienna Convention treaty, a type of document

140.
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1998).
141.
Id. at 373.
142.
Id. at 373.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
Id. at 374.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
149.
Id. at 375.
150.
Id. (citing Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(2), Apr. 24,
1963, 21 U.S.T. 77.).
151.
Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-76.
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that the Supreme Court has routinely recognized as possessing the
force of law. However, Medellin disallowed preemption, partially on
the grounds that President Bush's memorandum requesting
compliance with a ruling of the ICJ did not carry such power. The
Court in Breard ultimately found that it lacked the authority under
the Constitution to comply with the order of the ICJ.152 In doing so,
the Court bypassed analysis under the dormant foreign affairs power
altogether. Had the Breard case arrived on the Court's docket after
Garamendi, in which the Court found an interference with a foreign
policy interest sufficient to justify preemption, the Court may have
found that submitting to the authority of the ICJ was in the United
States' best foreign policy interest.1 5 3
In Garamendi, the Supreme Court upheld an executive
agreement's ability to preempt state law and ultimately serve as
binding domestic law.154 However, in Medellin, the Court found that
a presidential memorandum effectuating a decision by the lCJ did not
carry similar binding authority.1 5 5 In Garamendi, a conflict between
state law and federal action existed, while in Medellin, no express
state law was in place with which the President's memorandum could
conflict.' 56 Thus, these cases beg the question, can a generally
applicable rule be discerned from all of this conflicting precedent?
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Medellin, two lower court
decisions have addressed the issue of federal preemption of state law
in matters of foreign affairs,' 5 7 and both of these courts have found
preemption to be an appropriate remedy.1 58 However, neither made
reference to the Medellin decision and, instead, relied on the
Garamendi holding that executive agreements carry preemptive
weight.' 5 9
In Mousesian v. Versicherung, the Ninth Circuit
determined that an amendment to the California Code of Civil
Procedure that provided state courts with jurisdiction over claims
arising out of insurance policies held by victims of the Armenian
genocide was a violation of the foreign affairs doctrine. 6 0 Defendants

152.
Id. at 376.
153.
Steigman, supra note 41, at 483.
154.
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421, 425 (2003).
155.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530-32 (2008).
156.
Id. at 503-04; Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 408-09.
157.
See Movsesian v. Versicherung, 578 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that presidential policy prohibiting recognition of the Armenian genocide
preempted an amendment to the California Code of Civil Procedure that gave state
courts jurisdiction over claims arising out of insurance policies held by victims of the
Armenian genocide); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 578 F.3d 1016, 1019
(9th Cir. 2009) (holding that California statute allowing individuals to file claims
against museums to recover art seized by the Nazis intrudes on federal power to make
and resolve war).
158.
Mousesian, 578 F.3d at 1063; Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1029.
159.
Mousesian, 578 F.3d at 1059-60; Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1025.
160.
Mousesian, 578 F.3d at 1053.
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argued the amendment was preempted by the Claims Agreement of
1922, the War Claims Act of 1928, and "the Executive Branch's policy
prohibiting legislative recognition of an 'Armenian Genocide."' 1 6' In
its decision, the court cited Garamendi, stating, "presidential foreign
policy itself may carry the same preemptive force as a federal statute
or treaty."162 However, the policy in Mousesian was embodied in
letters from the President and not in an executive agreement. 63 The
court overlooked this distinction and argued that the form of the
policy was irrelevant.164 The more appropriate analysis investigated
the source of the President's authority to act.165 Citing Justice
Jackson's tripartite division of executive authority in Youngstown,166
the court found that issues of national security and foreign relations
were quintessential executive powers and, as such, presidential
actions in these areas carried preemptive weight.' 6 7 In addition, the
court found that congressional deference to this type of executive
authority through failed House resolutions evidenced implicit
acquiescence to this kind of exercise of power, therefore eliminating
the need for explicit congressional approval.168
The second case, Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art,
addressed the issue of whether a California statute permitting
individuals to file claims against museums for the recovery of art
seized by the Nazis infringed on the federal government's exclusive
authority to conduct foreign affairs.1 69 Defendants argued that the
policy adopted by President Truman at the Potsdam Conference,
which called for "'external restitution,' under which the looted art was
returned to the countries of origin-not to the individual owners"17 0
trumped the California statute that sought restitution of property for
the original owners.1 71 However, this policy proved unworkable and
was discontinued in 1948, though the federal government continued
to engage in efforts to recover the stolen art throughout the late
1990s.1 72 Because Truman's policy was no longer in effect, the
California statute did not directly conflict with any federal

161.
Id. at 1056.
162.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
163.
Id.
164.
Id. at 1059.
165.
Id.
166.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (defining a tripartite theory of presidential power).
167.
Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1059-60.
168.
Id. at 1060.
169.
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 578 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir.
2009).
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 1023; AM. COMM'N FOR THE PROT. AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND
HISTORIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS, M1944, RECORDS 1943-1946, at 148 (1946).

172.

Von Sahter, 578 F.3d at 1019-20, 1024.
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directive. 173 Therefore, the court applied the ruling in Zschernig and
asked whether the statute concerned an appropriate state function or
unnecessarily permeated the realm of foreign affairs. 174 The court
found that while returning property to wronged victims was a
legitimate goal, the state statute evidenced displeasure with the
federal government's attempts to remedy the situation and ultimately
sought to create a "'distinct juristic personality" from that of the
United States. 75 The court permitted federal preemption on the
grounds that the statute interfered with the federal government's
ability to wage and resolve war.17 6 Given that the restitution efforts
were inextricably linked with the crimes committed by the Nazi
regime during World War II, the court found that the "history of
federal action is so comprehensive and pervasive as to leave no room
for state legislation."' 7 7
These lower court decisions suggest that despite the confusion
that the Medellin decision infused into the foreign affairs preemption
analysis, perhaps the lower courts will continue to analyze foreign
affairs cases under the holding in Garamendi. However, these cases
give policy statements and letters from the President the binding
authority that the presidential memorandum in Medellin was
denied.17 8 Under this analysis, it appears that the decisions in
Mousesian and Saher are inconsistent with precedent. On the other
hand, perhaps the court found the precedent too confusing and
incompatible to discern an appropriate guiding principle. Through
adding these cases to the foreign affairs preemption analysis, the
question of which documents are sufficiently important to be granted
the force of law becomes exponentially more complicated.

IV. LIFE AFTER MEDELLIN

Up until Medellin, precedent seemed to suggest that federal
preemption required one of three scenarios: either a federal action
with the force of law and a conflict; congressional action; or
congressional acquiescence to preemption by a federal action of a
state's interference with matters of foreign affairs that were overly

173.
Id. at 1025.
174.
Id. at 1025-29.
175.
Id. at 1027.
176.
Id. at 1027-28.
177.
Id. at 1029.
178.
Movsesian v. Versicherung, 578 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding
that the California statute "stands in the way of the President's diplomatic objectives"
because it violates the policy disallowing a legislative recognition of an Armenian
genocide); Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1025 (stating that if the California statute had been
enacted after World War II when the federal government had a policy of external
restitution, the statute would have undoubtedly been preempted).
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substantial. Then, in Medellin, the Court did not grant a presidential
memorandum binding authority despite the presence of a conflict. It
refused to allow for preemption and, in doing so, did not allow for
congressional inaction to qualify as acquiescence as had been
previously permitted in Barclays Bank. As a result, after Medellin, it
appeared that the federal preemption doctrine was a fluid concept
that could be adjusted and tailored to fit differing factual
circumstances. In light of the Court's varying treatment of federal
preemption, the Medellin decision can be reconciled with previous
precedent by analyzing three distinct aspects of a given executive
action: whether the action had the force of law, whether a state law
conflicts with that executive action, and whether or not Congress has
approved of the action. A summary of the role these three factors
play in all of the preceding cases is provided in Appendix 1.
A. Executive Action Carries the Force of Law
As Appendix 1 shows, the existence or nonexistence of an
executive action that carries the force of law is not dispositive in
determining whether or not federal preemption of state law is
appropriate. Ironically, of the cases analyzed within this Note, the
Court granted only the executive agreements in Pink and Belmont
the force of law.17 9
Nonetheless, the Court determined that
preemption was appropriate in four other cases. At the same time,
the Court engaged in a discussion regarding the binding nature of
executive action in Crosby, Zschernig, and Medellin, although it
allowed for preemption in its absence. Conversely, Gararnendistands
for the proposition that, "the federal government's foreign policy
interests are sufficient, standing alone, to preempt a valid state
law."180
From these premises, one can deduce that the Court
routinely recognizes that while an executive action's binding nature is
neither sufficient nor necessary to allow for federal preemption of
state law, it is a factor that is often considered and more readily
enables the Court to justify preemption in close cases.
B. Conflict Between State Law and Executive Action
As previously mentioned in the discussion of field preemption, a
direct conflict between state law and executive action need not exist
in order to allow for federal preemption of state law in matters of
foreign affairs. However, permitting federal preemption of state law
is easiest in matters in which the federal government has effectuated

179.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-33 (1937).
180.
Steigman, supra note 41, at 480.
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an agreement that has the force of law and conflicts with a state law.
These cases are most easily justified by invoking the Supremacy
Clause.' 8 1 Of the cases represented in Appendix 1, Medellin is the
only case in which the Court articulated their finding of a conflict and
yet refrained from allowing for preemption. In Garamendi, the Court
manufactured a conflict in order to avoid a constitutional analysis of
the foreign affairs power in favor of a statutory analysis under the
Supremacy Clause. 182 Garamendi represents the Court's most liberal
application of conflict preemption and the Court's willingness to
create a conflict if one is not immediately cognizable. But, the Court
found no such conflict in Medellin. Since Medellin represents the
Court's most recent treatment of the federal preemption of state law
in matters of foreign affairs, perhaps the case should be viewed as the
exception rather than the rule.
C. CongressionalApproval
The holdings in Belmont and Zschernig relied partially on the
existence of congressional action in order to allow for preemption. In
order to better understand the role that Congress plays in matters of
foreign affairs preemption, an analysis of the cooperative relationship
between the Executive and Legislative Branches of the federal
government is beneficial. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
Justice Jackson established a framework for determining when the
Executive Branch's authority supersedes that of the Legislative:
When the President acts in absence of either a Congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
Therefore, Congressional inertia, indifference, or quiescence may
sometimes, at least in a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures
of independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test
of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
18 3
law.

When Congress authorizes the presidential action, as it did in
Belmont, federal preemption is more readily permitted. However, the

181.
See Pink, 315 U.S. at 230 (stating that international compacts and
agreements, like the Litvinov Assignment at issue in this case, are the law of the land
under the Supremacy Clause); see also Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 (recognizing the
supremacy of the United States' external powers, such as treaties and international
agreements, with regard to state laws or policies).
182.
See Steigman, supra note 41, at 476 ("Invalidating a state law under the
foreign affairs power is a constitutional decision, while ruling that a statute is
preempted under the Supremacy Clause only requires a statutory analysis.").
183.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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Garamendi and Medellin decisions fall within the area of
congressional inertia, whereby the President is implicitly authorized
to act. 184 At the same time, Garamendi allowed for preemption and
Medellin did not.185 Because this inconsistency makes reconciliation
of these two holdings difficult, the Court vacillates in its
interpretation of congressional inertia in terms of its deference to
executive action.
D. Reconciliation
With the assistance of Appendix 1, this Note specifically seeks to
reconcile the Court's differing approaches in the Garamendi and
Medellin cases for purposes of discerning a guiding principle for
application in future judicial encounters with this issue. The holding
in Medellin undermined all previous analyses of the issue, and the
Court did not provide reconciliation of seemingly conflicting
precedent. 186 In order to ascertain a rule that governs future
approaches to this issue, the holdings in Medellin and Garamendi
must be viewed as harmonious rather than disjointed.
As Appendix 1 shows, in both Garamendi and Medellin the
executive action did not have the force of law and a direct conflict
existed between the federal action and the state action, but Congress
had yet to inject itself into the situation.1 87
In Garamendi,
congressional inaction was interpreted as a relinquishing of
legislative authority to the Executive Branch rather than as
condoning the state's efforts to regulate.18 8 Analyzing the case under
this premise suggests that congressional acquiescence is irrelevant
when a state action conflicts with a foreign policy interest of the
Executive Branch.1 89 However, in Medellin, congressional inaction
was viewed as sufficient to imply disapproval of the Executive's
attempts to preempt state actions. 19 0 Taken together, these two cases
present nearly identical factors yielding conflicting outcomes.
One possible explanation for this differing treatment is that the
chart misrepresents the Court's approach. While all three factors are
routinely taken into an account, perhaps it is not a factor analysis,
but rather a balancing test similar to the one adopted in

184.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524-25 (2008); Am. Ins. Ass'n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414-15 (2003).
185.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 531-32; Garanendi, 539 U.S. at 427.
186.
See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
187.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 491; Garantendi, 539 U.S. at 396.
188.
Steigman, supra note 41, at 488.
189.
Id.
190.
See generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 528 (holding that Congress had
not acquiesced to the President's memorandum making the ICJ judgment at issue
domestic law).
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Garamendi.191 The Court in Medellin, although never explicitly
acknowledging it, appeared to adopt the balancing approach utilized
92
in Garamendi.1
Specifically, the Court in Garamendi articulated
this test, stating, "the state's interest in the regulation should be
balanced against the impact of the regulation on foreign relations."1 9 3
Before Garamendi, conflict with a foreign policy interest, without
manifestation in the form of a binding federal law, had never been
sufficient to justify preemption. 194 After Garamendi, in Medellin, the
Court found that while a presidential memorandum did not carry the
force of law, such a finding was irrelevant because the state's interest
in resolving criminal cases trumped the federal government's interest
in adhering to its obligations under the Vienna Convention.
Because the Supreme Court has yet to offer a legal justification
for this inconsistency, an analysis based on policy can illuminate the
Judiciary's motives. Garamendi was a case that involved rectifying
past losses of innocent victims of the Holocaust' 9 5 In that case, the
Court took a more activist position and determined that the federal
government was the more effective mechanism by which these
restitution obligations could be satisfied.19 6 Thus, the Court allowed
preemption as a means of ensuring the same due process rights for
victims among different states while simultaneously maintaining
diplomatic relations with foreign nations.1 9 7
However, the Court
provided no analysis of the policy objectives of their actions.19 8
Rather, the Court opted to justify, although tenuously, their decision
"given the 'concern for uniformity in this country's dealing with
foreign nations' 19 9 and the principle that in matters of "foreign
affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to act."2 0 0
Moreover, the Court emphasized that the President has the authority
to enter into executive agreements without the approval of
Congress. 20 1
At the same time, the Supreme Court has historically granted
executive agreements preemptive authority, provided a preemptive
clause is included in that agreement.2 02
In Garamendi, the

191.
See Gararnendi, 539 U.S. at 419-20.
192.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring).
193.
Steigman, supra note 41, at 474 (citing Gararnendi,539 U.S. at 419-20).
194.
Gararnendi,539 U.S. at 442 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
195.
Id. at 402-03.
196.
Id. at 406.
197.
Id. at 413, 442-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
198.
Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that because the HVIRA takes
no position on any contemporary foreign government, it "requires no assessment of any
existing foreign regime").
199.
Id. at 413 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427
n.25 (1964)).
200.
Id. at 414.
201.
Id. at 415.
202.
Id. at 416-17.
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preemptive clause, which permitted the application of preemption
under the holding in Zschernig and the dormant foreign affairs
power, was absent.2 03 While this paradigmatic approach sufficed for
the Garamendi decision, it received considerable criticism after the
Medellin decision was released. 204 Thus, the decision reflects a
problematic reliance on the dormant foreign affairs power disguising
the Court's greater policy objectives to provide a streamlined
approach to resolving issues arising out of World War II.
In contrast, Medellin found that permitting preemption would
have essentially allowed for the federal government to interfere with
the state justice system 20 5 that is presumably unbiased, independent,
and allows for maximum rights for the accused. The President's
memorandum called for conformity with the ICJ's decision, and
enforcing that decision would have deprived Medellin of a separate
and independent adjudication to which he was entitled under the Due
Process Clause.2 06 The Court relied on the sensitivity of the foreign
policy objectives that state courts would have to address.20 7 The
Court proceeded by likening the memorandum to a treaty that
requires implementing legislation, promulgated by Congress, in order
to be effectuated. 2 08 Under the Vienna Convention, the United States
was obligated to submit Medellin to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, but
there was nothing in the treaty that required the holdings of those
courts to be binding on domestic courts.2 0 9 Using Gararnendi'sown
words, adjudicating claims is a "traditional state responsibility" that

203.
Id. at 417.
204.
See Edward Swaine, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute's Legal
Center for Public Interest Panel Discussion on Medellin v. Texas: Presidential Power
and International Tribunals (Sept. 27, 2007), reprinted in 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 160,
162 (2008).
[S]omebody who ordinarily is in favor of strong presidential authority may balk
when it comes to interfering with the rights of the states, and those who are
often pro-international may have difficulties with the assertion of presidential
authority. I may appear to be one of the lingering few who supports the
enforcement of international obligations under these particular circumstances.
But let me just identify for you the broader spectrum of opinion, which I think
suggests that I'm really not at the extreme but rather somewhat more of a
centrist in this regard.
Id.
205.
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (rejecting the argument
that the President may, pursuant to his foreign affairs authority, "compel[] state courts
to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state laws").
206.
Id. at 503; Bush Memorandum, supra note 120; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. V, § 2 ("[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.").
207.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 511.
208.
Id. at 508-10.
209.
Id. at 507-08.
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should not be interfered with by the federal government.210 Without
explicitly acknowledging it, the Court actually relied on a portion of
the Garamendi analysis in order to provide a mechanism through
which they could comfortably disallow federal preemption.
Both cases utilized somewhat textual arguments, but Garamendi
overlooked the traditional requirement that executive agreements
include express clauses authorizing preemption, while Medellin relied
fully on the text of the Vienna Convention to disallow preemption
without direct congressional authorization. 21 1 While the Supreme
Court has routinely invoked Garamendi's call for uniformity in
matters of foreign affairs, the Court arguably found that the need to
provide a fair and independent judicial system trumped the interest
in uniformity. With these precepts in mind, perhaps the decisions in
Saher and Mousesian are easier to understand. Like Garamendi,
both cases were directed at the federal government's efforts to recover
property stolen from victims of genocide. 2 12 In Mousesian, the
decision was made easier by legislative history that evinced
preliminary efforts by Congress to legislate, which culminated in the
ultimate decision to refrain from doing so. 2 1 3
As a result,
congressional deference to the state's right to delegate was easily
ascertainable. 2 14
In Saher, the Court relied heavily on the "traditional state
responsibility" argument, finding that California had a "legitimate
interest in regulating the museums and galleries operating within its
border, and preventing them from trading in and displaying Nazilooted art."2 1 5 However, the Court found California's interest was not
strong enough to disallow preemption and utilized a field preemption
analysis instead.2 16 Citing the federal government's historical efforts
to provide restitution to the Jewish people, the Court found no
additional room for states to legislate in the area.2 17 The need for
negotiation rather than an adversarial approach, as well as the
potential far-reaching effects that restitution orders could have on the
international community, helped to justify the government's
preemption of the state's efforts to legislate. 2 18 The three cases of

210.
See Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 n.11 (2003) ("If a State
were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to be
addressing a traditional state responsibility, field preemption might be the appropriate
doctrine . . . .").
211.
Medellin v. Texas, 522 U.S. at 522-23.
212.
Movsesian v. Versicherung, 578 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009); Von Saher
v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 578 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009).
213.
Moisesian, 578 F.3d at 1057-59.
214.
Id.
215.
Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1026.
216.
Id. at 1027.
217.
Id. at 1027-29.
218.
Id. at 1029.
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Garamendi, Mousesian, and Saher suggest that in matters involving
the restitution obligations of Nazi looters, enforcement is best left to
the federal government. If the federal government has traditionally
treated the matter as a state responsibility and doing otherwise could
potentially undermine the values of the American judicial system, the
Court appears more reluctant to allow for federal preemption.

V. CONCLUSION

The increased implementation of the foreign affairs preemption
doctrine demonstrates that, in some cases, "rather than having a
presumption against preemption and in favor of concurrency, some
judges have relied on a presumed special federal authority over areas
related to foreign affairs . . . to find local initiatives illegal."2 19

This

underlying predicate has revitalized the foreign affairs preemption
doctrine and permitted courts to exercise a significant amount of
discretion. As a result, prior precedents involving matters of foreign
affairs preemption have been reinvigorated and incorporated into the
Court's newly established, seemingly dynamic approach to foreign
affairs preemption jurisprudence. 220 Within the last decade, the
doctrine has undergone significant changes and the conflicting results
of the Garamendi and Medellin cases have required the
ascertainment of a uniform principle of law.
From a results-based perspective, arguably the decisions in
Garamendi and Medellin were the correct decisions. 2 21
In
Garamendi, the Court recognized the cooperative spirit underlying
the German Foundation Agreement and effectuated the intent of the
drafters to avoid upholding state legislation that sought to undercut
that spirit.22 2 As a result, victims of the Nazi invasion of World War
II could be compensated for their losses through a mechanism that
ensured fairness and uniformity.2 2 3 Similarly, Medellin upheld the
independence of domestic courts from intervention by international
forums for dispute resolution. 224 In the end, the independence of the
American judicial system was preserved.
Leaving aside the
appropriateness of the decisions as a matter of ultimate
consequences, the legitimacy of the decisions from a jurisprudential
standpoint is difficult to determine.

219.
Resnik, supra note 24, at 72 (citing Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F. Supp.
2d 477, 517-33 (M.D. Pa. 2007)).
220.
See supra notes 157-78 and accompanying text.
221.
Crace, supra note 89, at 224.
222.
Id.
223.
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 406, 422-23 (2003).
224.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 529-30 (2008).
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The foreign affairs preemption doctrine is one that scholars and
courts have debated and adjusted for decades. Since Zschernig, the
Supreme Court has grappled with varying approaches to questions of
federal preemption of state law, both in matters in which the federal
government has acted with the force of law and in situations in which
they have failed to act, but argue for exclusive authority in regulating
a given activity. 225 The twenty-first century decisions of Garamendi
and Medellin have appeared to further complicate the situation.
While the analysis of the conflict between the decisions in Medellin
and Garamendi can be distilled down to three major components,
reconciling these decisions requires a much more general analysis
based largely on the policy preferences of the federal government and
the degree of intervention with which the federal government is
comfortable. Garamendi relied heavily on the importance of the need
for uniformity in matters of foreign affairs in which the federal
government is involved to the detriment of California's ability to
satisfy restitution claims of local Holocaust victims. 226 Medellin,
however, opted to preserve litigation of criminal suits as a traditional
state responsibility that was immune from preemption by holdings in
the ICJ under the Vienna Convention.22 7 While the Court did not
explicitly base its decision on these policy interests, the Court was
able to distinguish the actions of Congress in both cases in order to
permit broad executive authority.
The decisions of Garamendi and Medellin expanded the foreign
affairs preemption doctrine to situations in which a conflict with a
federal policy exists and the federal government has not yet
articulated that policy.
Nonetheless, this expansion may not
necessarily be a negative development in the area of foreign affairs
preemption. Dormant foreign affairs preemption, while somewhat
subjective, "can be narrowly tailored to work without sacrificing the
flexibility needed to respond to state interference with federal
responsibilities." 228 While expanding preemptive authority perhaps
prevents states from effectuating change in the international
realm, 229 empowering the federal government with the sole authority
to determine foreign policy and pursue that policy could result in an
increase in the predictability of the actions of the federal government.
Keeping in mind "the U.S. foreign policy on the subject, the state
legislation's potentially adverse effects on that policy, the state
legislation's potential adverse effect on foreign policy in general, as
well as the state's own interest in legislating in the first place ,"230

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Crace, supra note 89, at 223-24.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413-14.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 520.
Crace, supra note 89, at 225.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 228-29.
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courts will likely balance this multitude of factors in a manner that
preserves the federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs
while simultaneously permitting state governments to participate in
a system of governance that is becoming increasingly transnational.
Carolyn A. Pytynia*
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Appendix 1
Force of
Case
No preemption

Congressional

Law

Conflict

Action

Preemption

No

No

No

No
Yes

problem
Belmont

Yes

Yes

Yes

Medellin

No

Yes

No

No

Barclays Banh/
Garamendi

No

Yes

No

Yes

Zschernig

No

No

Yes

Yes

Field preemption

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Pink

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Supremacy Clause

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Movsesian

No

Yes

No

Yes

Saher

No

Yes

No

Yes

